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Private accreditation of health care institutions serves crucial quality
assurance functions in the American health care system. Since the advent of
widespread third-party payment for health care services in the mid-twentieth
century, third-party payers have used private accreditation to thereby identify
which health care institutions are qualified to provide services for payment to
their beneficiaries. Private accreditation serves to alleviate the need for third-
party payers to make independent assessments of the quality of their providers'
facilities and services.
As the federal government and states became third-party payers when the
Medicare and Medicaid programs came on-line in 1965, they used private
accreditation to identify qualified hospitals in a fashion similar to that of private
insurers. For hospitals and, later, other health care institutions, the federal
government and states used private accreditation as evidence of compliance with
Medicare conditions of participation and state licensure laws, respectively. In
so doing, the government effectively delegated regulatory responsibility for
assuring that health care institutions meet the requisite quality standards for
participation in their respective programs.
When government relies on private accreditors to perform this important
function, questions arise as to whether all the legitimate interests of the public
served by public health insurance programs are adequately protected and/or
promoted. First, are private accreditors capable of identifying the characteristics
of health care institutions and the services they provide that assure quality of
care and of developing uniform standards? Second, do private accreditors have
sufficient staff and resources to ensure compliance with quality standards?
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Third, does government selection of one private accrediting body give an
inappropriate imprimatur to one organization vis-d-vis another competing
accrediting organization? Finally, does such government selection inappropri-
ately shape the direction of quality assurance standards for affected health care
institutions as well as distort the information about quality that consumers might
derive from the fact of accreditation, particularly information from competing
but unannointed accreditors?
These issues are especially important in today's health care reform climate
because health care institutions are fundamentally changing the types of care
they deliver and the ways in which they deliver it. More and more, acute and
long-term care is provided on an outpatient basis or at home. At the same
time, new types of health care institutions are emerging. Also, new ways of
defining and measuring quality of health and long-term care services are
emerging that are revolutionizing quality assurance methods for health care
services. The Clinton Administration, Congress, and many states considered
various proposals for a comprehensive public health insurance program.1 These
proposals have extensive provisions for quality assurance and monitoring.2 Yet
little attention was given to the role that private accreditation should play in the
regulation of health care institutions under any of these reform proposals.
This article explores the appropriateness of the use of private accreditation
in defining and regulating the quality of health care providers under government
health insurance programs. First, the article describes the various functions of
private accreditation in public health insurance programs. Second, it reviews the
history of the use of private accreditation in state licensure programs as well as
in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Third, it proposes a theory for
deciding when private accreditation should be used by public health insurance
programs for defining and regulating the quality of different types of health care
institutions. The article concludes with some general observations about how
the role of private accreditation could be structured to protect and promote all
legitimate interests of consumers and providers in the quality of their various
health care institutions.
1. See, e.g., Comprehensive Family Health Access and Savings Act, S. 1796, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993, S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993);
Consumer Choice Health Security Act of 1993, S. 1743, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); The Health
Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (The President's Proposal); The Managed
Competition Act of 1993, H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Affordable Health Care Now Act
of 1993, H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); The Mediplan Act of 1993, H.R. 2610, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993); The American Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see
also Deborah L. Rogal & W. David Helms, State Models: An Overview, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Summer
1993, at 27.
2. Timothy S. Jost, Health System Reform: Forward or Backward with Quality Oversight?, 271
JAMA 1508 (1994).
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THE TRADITION OF PRIVATE ACCREDITATION
A. The Functions of Accreditation
The basic purpose of accreditation is to establish that an organization has
met and continues to meet specified standards. Accreditation serves as an
assurance of quality for consumers of the organization's services. It is a
voluntary process by which an organization demonstrates that it meets the
standards established by professional peers. Organizations seeking accreditation
are generally nonprofit entities that offer valued services-health care or
education, for example-about which consumers have difficulty assessing quality
without expert guidance. Customarily, accreditation is performed by private
organizations that have expertise in defining and measuring the quality of
services offered by the organization seeking accreditation.
Accreditation involves two important and distinct functions. First, it defines
standards by which to establish and measure quality. Second, it determines
whether organizations have complied with these standards, thereby warranting
accreditation. In administrative law parlance, the standard-setting function is
a legislative function in that it involves prospective policymaking of general
applicability, and the compliance determination is an adjudicative function of
ascertaining whether a particular organization is actually in compliance with
established standards.3
Congress and administrative agencies have often delegated their respective
legislative functions to private organizations, and they have adopted the
standards of these organizations for public regulatory programs.' The rationale
for such delegation is that private bodies have unique expertise, leading to
better standards.' It is less common for Congress and administrative agencies
to delegate a compliance determination function, although private accreditors
also have staffs with expertise to determine if standards are in fact being met.'
This distinction between the legislative function of establishing standards and
the adjudicative function of compliance determination is crucial in the health
care field for another reason. The compliance determination function goes to
the heart of whether a specific provider of services has the requisite resources,
3. Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Terminology and the Administrative Procedure Act, 48 MICH.
L. REV. 57 (1949).
4. See, e.g., Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and
Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1989); Kurt L. Hanslowe, Regulation by Visible
Public and Invisible Private Government, 40 TEX. L. REV. 88 (1961); Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by
Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive:
Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L.
REV. 62 (1990); Note, Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Groups, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 80
(1932).
5. See Abramson, supra note 4, at 179-80; Krent, supra note 4, at 85-86.
6. Abramson, supra note 4, at 194-99; Hanslowe, supra note 4, at 113-27.
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management, and experience to protect public health and safety in the delivery
of services. To what extent should government turn such a crucial responsibility
over to private organizations and, if it does so, how can it be sure that the
function is being performed in a manner that ensures protection of the public
and also fairness to providers?
B. Licensure and Private Accreditation in the Health Care Industry
Government has historically assumed a minimal role in regulating the quality
of care provided in health care institutions. Indeed, government regulation of
health care institutions in any capacity is a very recent phenomenon.7 Until
the twentieth century, most health care was provided at home. Only the poor
received care in health care facilities, often as a last resort and on a charity
basis.8 Their lack of direct governmental regulation is attributable to the
unique historical development of health care institutions in the United States.
Historically, hospitals were institutions like almshouses that took care of the
destitute.9 In the late nineteenth century, hospitals began to assume a different
role and function in the U.S. health care system.10 As medical science
progressed, the medical profession developed the hospital as the institution in
which it could best provide highly technical care. Hospitals then became
citadels of healing under the dominance of the medical profession, as they
remain today.11
The history of nursing homes is much different. Unlike hospitals, nursing
homes as distinct organizations emerged during the Great Depression when
homeowners sought to augment their incomes and often protect ownership of
their homes by taking in aged individuals for money. 2 Gradually, two crucial
trends developed: boarding homes hired nurses and styled themselves as
"nursing" homes to attract more clients, and absentee owners replaced resident
7. See MICHAEL G. MACDONALD ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 5.02
(1985); KENNETH R. WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 120 (2d ed. 1985); Louise Lander,
Licensing of Health Care Facilities, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH POLICY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 128
(Ruth Roemer & George McKray eds., 1980); Milton I. Roemer, Controlling and Promoting Quality
in Medical Care, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 284 (Spring 1970); William Worthington & Laurens H.
Silver, Regulation of Quality of Care in Hospitals: The Need for Change, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
305 (Spring 1970).
8. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 145-54 (1982).
9. See id. at 147; John H. Knowles, Emergence of the Hospital as a Social Institution, in
MAINSTREAMS OF MEDICINE: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT OF MEDICAL
PRACTICE 53-73 (Lester S. King ed., 1971).
10. George Rosen, The Hospital: Historical Sociology of a Community Institution, in THE
HOSPITAL IN MODERN SOCIETY (Eliot Freidson ed., 1963); Charles E. Rosenberg, Inward Vision and
Outward Glance: The Shaping of the American Hospital, 1880-1914, in SOCIAL HISTORY AND SOCIAL
POLICY (David J. Rothman & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1981).
11. See STARR, supra note 8, at 145-179; see also DAVID ROSNER, A ONCE CHARITABLE
ENTERPRISE: HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE IN BROOKLYN AND NEW YORK, 1885-1915 (1982).
12. Michael R. Carlston, Government Regulation of Nursing Homes-An Inquiry, 1973 UTAH L.
REV. 270; Lander, supra note 7, at 132; John J. Regan, Quality Assurance Systems in Nursing Homes,
53 J. URB. 153 (1975).
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owners.'3 The development of nursing homes was enhanced by enactment of
the Old Age Assistance program in 1935, which paid for limited nursing home
care and allowed states to move elderly poor to nursing homes from state or
locally funded almshouses.14 The modem nursing home industry really took
shape following enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1965,
both of which included nursing home benefits. The number of nursing homes,
particularly for-profit facilities, increased 140 percent between 1960 and 1976,
and nursing home beds increased more than three hundred percent during the
same period.'
The unique history of nursing homes as nonmedical, for-profit ventures is
important to the subsequent history of the safety and quality problems with
nursing home care and the regulation of nursing homes. Indeed, the history of
nursing homes has been replete with serious concerns about service quality and
even safety of residents.
16
Home health agencies have quite a different history from both hospitals and
nursing homes. The initial impetus for the development of home health
agencies was the visiting nurse movement of the late nineteenth century.17 The
public health nursing and visiting nurse agencies of today emerged from the
Sanitary Revolution and other reform movements of the nineteenth century.'8
Like nursing homes, Medicare and Medicaid had a dramatic impact on the
growth and shape of the home health industry. Between 1967 and 1985, the
number of Medicare certified home health agencies, a great number of which
were for-profit, increased from 1809 to 5983."9 Much of the expansion
occurred after 1980, when Congress eliminated several Medicare program
requirements such as the prior hospitalization requirement, the cap on covered
days, and many restrictions on the participation of for-profit agencies.2'
The historical development of quality assurance for health care institutions
is characterized by two important and interrelated trends: private accreditation
and state licensure. The earliest formal efforts for quality assurance in health
care institutions developed in hospitals. A crucial development occurred in
1919, when the American College of Surgeons established the Hospital
13. Lander, supra note 7, at 132; Regan, supra note 12, at 156.
14. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 1-2, 49 Stat. 620 (codified at scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.); see Lander, supra note 7, at 132.
15. FRANK E. Moss & VAL J. HALAMANDARIS, Too OLD, Too SICK, Too BAD 6-7, Figure 1.1
(1977).
16. MARY A. MENDELSON, TENDER LOVING GREED (1974); Moss & HALAMANDARIS, supra note
15; BRUCE C. VLADECK, UNLOVING CARE: THE NURSING HOME TRAGEDY (1980).
17. JOSEPHINE A. DOLAN, HISTORY OF NURSING 260 (1968).
18. PHILIP A. KALISCH & BEATRICE J. KALISCH, THE ADVANCE OF AMERICAN NURSING 410
(1986).
19. Robert G. Hoyer, Recent Medicare Cutbacks: Their Impact on Home Health Agency
Participation, CARING (Aug. 1988) 58, 59 (citing unpublished Health Care Financing Administration
data).
20. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 930,94 Stat. 2599,2631-33 (codified
as amended in scattered subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see SHELAH G.
LEADER, HOME HEALTH BENEFITS UNDER MEDICARE (1986).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Standardization Program, thus adopting and promoting a private accreditation
model.2 Throughout the early twentieth century, hospital quality assurance
remained predominantly a private matter.
State licensure, the major regulatory tool for assuring that health care
institutions meet minimal quality standards, followed private accreditation.
Most states did not require licensure of hospitals and other health care
institutions until the middle of the twentieth century. The Hill-Burton Act,
enacted in 1946, required state licensure as a condition for receiving construc-
tion funds and other financial assistance, and the program suspended funding
to states that did not have the requisite licensure requirements for hospitals and
other health care institutions.22
In the early 1950s, the American College of Surgeons joined with other
physician professional associations and the American Hospital Association to
establish the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (the "JCAH").23
In part, this move was inspired by the states, which had been licensing hospitals
to comply with the Hill-Burton Act. Hospitals and the medical profession were
concerned about maintaining private accreditation as the predominant
regulatory model as it accorded the hospital industry autonomy and control over
the definition and regulation of quality in hospitals.24
Since the 1950s, the JCAH, now the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (the "JCAHO"),2 has been the predominant private
accrediting body for allopathic health care organizations. Initially, the JCAHO
accredited only hospitals. However, it added a program for psychiatric facilities
in 1960 and a program for rehabilitation facilities in 1967.26 It is noteworthy
that the movement for developing private standards through accreditation, like
licensure, was spurred by the Hill-Burton hospital construction program.'
Further, states used JCAHO accreditation increasingly in their own licensure
programs to set licensure standards and demonstrate compliance with those
standards.' By 1983, thirty-seven states had incorporated JCAHO accredita-
tion in some capacity.
29
21. Timothy S. Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private Regulation of
Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835, 841-49 (1983); Carl P. Schlicke, American
Surgery's Noblest Experiment, 106 ARCHIVES OF SURGERY 379 (1973).
22. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291a-291o (1988)); see MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 7, at § 5.02; WING,
supra note 7, at 120; Jost, supra note 21, at 849-50.
23. See Jost, supra note 21, at 849-52; James S. Roberts, et al., A History of the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals, 258 JAMA 936 (1987).
24. Jost, supra note 21, at 854.
25. In 1987, the JCAH changed its name to the JCAHO in response to the increasingly diverse
nature of modem health care institutions. JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE
ORGS., COMMITTED TO QUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITA-
TION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 14 (1990).
26. Jost, supra note 21, at 852.
27. Roemer, supra note 7, at 284.
28. Jost, supra note 21, at 844 n.65.
29. Id.
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The availability of funds for nursing home care under the Old Age
Assistance program of the Social Security Act of 193530 encouraged thirty-five
states to initiate licensure for nursing homes.3' The remaining states adopted
licensure for nursing homes by mid-century in response to the 1950 amendments
to the Old Age Assistance nursing home benefit a2 that allowed payments
directly to licensed providers on the condition that states establish and enforce
standards for funded institutions. 33 In 1953, Congress extended the Hill-Burton
Act construction benefits to nonprofit long-term care facilities and imposed the
same condition of state licensure for receipt of federal funding. 4  These
additional mandates finally moved all states to begin licensing nursing homes.
35
Within a few years of its creation, the JCAHO developed accreditation
standards for long-term care facilities. In 1965, the JCAHO expanded its scope
to include accreditation of long-term care organizations and included representa-
tives of nursing home trade associations as JCAHO commissioners.36
However, by refusing to incorporate JCAHO accreditation of nursing homes
into the Medicare quality assurance system in the way it did for hospitals,37 the
federal government reduced incentives for JCAHO's efforts to enlist long-term
care facilities to pursue JCAHO accreditation.38
In contrast, states were quite late in getting into the business of licensing
home health agencies. Indeed, it was not until after the enactment in 1965 of
the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which included home health as a covered
benefit, that most states adopted their home health agency licensure statutes.
39
The Medicare program required participating home health agencies to comply
with Home Health Agency Conditions of Participation, and the Medicaid
program required home health agencies to be licensed under state law.4'
Interestingly, contemporary observers of the early years of the Medicare
program assert that the Medicare Conditions of Participation for home health
agencies were the first standards for home health agencies ever developed.41
30. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
31. See Patricia A. Butler, Assuring the Quality of Care and Life in Nursing Homes: The Dilemma
of Enforcement, 57 N.C. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (1979).
32. Social Security Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, § 303, 64 Stat. 477, 549 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 306 (1988)).
33. See Butler, supra note 31, at 1319.
34. Medical Facilities Survey and Construction Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 68-482, § 4(g), 68 Stat. 461,
465 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 632) (repealed Oct. 13, 1988).
35. Lander, supra note 7, at 132-33.
36. Jost, supra note 21, at 852. In a subsequent reorganization, the JCAHO eliminated the long-
term care representatives from the Commission. Id.
37. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
38. See Schlicke, supra note 21.
39. Sandra H. Johnson, Quality-Control Regulation of Home Health Care, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 901,
935 (1989).
40. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 1861(o), 1902(a)(22)(B), 79 Stat.
286, 319, 348 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(o), 1396a(a)(22)(B) (1988)); see Paul E.
Hankwitz, Quality Assurance in Home Care, 7 GERIATRIC HOME CARE 847, 852-53 (1991).
41. HERMAN M. SOMERS & ANNE R. SOMERS, MEDICARE AND THE HOSPITALS: ISSUES AND
PROSPECTS 36 (1967).
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Currently, about forty states actually license home health agencies and
require them to meet quality standards as a condition of licensure. 42 However,
most states require licensure only if the home health agency provides skilled
nursing services. 43 In general, state licensure of home health agencies tends to
be undeveloped and narrow in coverage with inconsistent or even lax
enforcement.44
Perhaps one reason that home health agencies are treated differently with
respect to state licensure than are hospitals or nursing homes is the tradition of
pluralistic accreditation of home health agencies through organizations of the
nursing profession. The National League of Nursing has accredited home health
agencies for nearly thirty years,45 with a total of about six hundred agencies
presently accredited. ' The JCAHO got involved with home health agency
accreditation late in the game. It did not begin accrediting hospital-based home
health agencies until the late 1970s. 47 The JCAHO currently accredits more
than 3000 home care organizations, of which 1700 are also Medicare certified
agencies.' In 1988, the JCAHO issued its first standards for free-standing
home health agencies, and since then it has become increasingly involved in
quality issues in home-based, long-term care.49 Despite the pluralistic tradition,
private accreditation has never had much currency or support among home
health professionals as it has had with the hospital community.'
In sum, the licensure and private accreditation efforts for health care
facilities occurred contemporaneously. Further, both efforts were spurred on
by government programs to fund facility construction or services. Consequently,
when states got into the business of regulating health care institutions, they
relied heavily on the mechanism of private accreditation as a means of
determining whether health care institutions met the requisite standards for
licensure.51 Indeed, as indicated above, nearly two-thirds of states have
42. Johnson, supra note 38, at 933-34 (desribing and analyzing in detail state licensure of home
health agencies).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 923.
45. NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR NURSING, ACCREDITATION OF HOME HEALTH AGENCIES AND
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICES (1976), as updated, NAT'L LEAGUE FOR NURSING, ACCREDITATION
CRITERIA, STANDARDS, AND SUBSTANTIATING EVIDENCES (1987); see Johnson, supra note 38, at 906.
46. Telephone interview with Harry Wade, Director of Public Information Services, National
League of Nursing (Jan. 11, 1994).
47. JOINT COMM'N ON THE ACCREDITATION OF HOSPS., ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR
HOSPITALS 47 (1978), as updated, JOINT COMM'N ON THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS.
(JCAHO), STANDARDS FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS (1993); see Johnson, supra note 38,
at 905 n.20.
48. Deemed Status Option Now Available for Joint Commission Accredited Home Health Agencies,
JOINT COMMISSION BULLETIN: HOME CARE: AN UPDATE ON THE JOINT COMMISSION'S
ACCREDITATION PROGRAM (JCAHO/Dept. of Publications, Chicago, I1.), Summer 1993 at 1, 2.
49. See, e.g., JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., QUALITY IMPROVE-
MENT IN HOME CARE (1993); JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., QUALITY
ASSURANCE IN HOME CARE ORGANIZATIONS AND HOSPICE PROGRAMS (1990).
50. Johnson, supra note 38, at 931.
51. Jost, supra note 21, at 844-45.
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incorporated JCAHO standards into licensing programs for health care
institutions.52 In so doing, many states also left the determination of licensure
standards to private accrediting bodies, a situation which remains true today.5 3
III
THE USE OF PRIVATE ACCREDITATION IN THE MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
PROGRAMS
Utilizing private health insurance to pay for health care services provided in
institutions became widespread in the middle of the twentieth century.5
Health insurers used private accreditation to perform two critical functions: (1)
assuring that covered services for which they paid were provided by a high
quality provider, defined as an accredited provider, and (2) defining covered
benefits as only services furnished by an accredited provider. Indeed, about
twenty percent of private health insurance plans of Blue Cross and Blue
Shield-the predominant health insurer in the mid-twentieth century-used
private accreditation to accomplish one or both of these functions."
A. The Medicare Program
Consequently, it is not surprising that Congress looked to private accredita-
tion as a quality assurance mechanism for the Medicare program.56 The
Johnson Administration and Congress were both anxious to get Medicare up
and running as quickly as possible but were concerned that the program pay
only for high quality care.57 Further, the federal government needed the
cooperation of hospitals and physicians to launch the program successfully. The
use of private accreditation was reassuring to hospitals and the medical
profession, and it was instrumental in securing their eventual cooperation in the
Medicare program.58
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") also viewed
private accreditation in the Medicare program as a mechanism for assuring that
the Medicare program did not intrude inappropriately into the practice of
medicine or hospital management. 59 Further, Congress explicitly did not want
52. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
53. MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 7, at § 5.02; Worthington & Silver, supra note 7, at 305.
54. See Herman M. Somers & Anne R. Somers, Private Health Insurance, Part One: Changing
Patterns of Medical Care Demand and Supply in Relation to Health Insurance, 46 CAL. L. REV. 376
(1958); Herman M. Somers & Anne R. Somers, Private Health Insurance, Part Two: Problems, Pressures
and Prospects, 46 CAL. L. REV. 508 (1958).
55. Schlicke, supra note 21, at 381.
56. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1861(e), 79 Stat. 286, 314 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
57. See Jost, supra note 21, at 853; see also JUDITH M. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF
FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE 7-32 (1977) (discussing in detail the deliberations over the role of the
JCAH in the Medicare program).
58. SOMERS & SOMERS, supra note 40, at 87; Jost, supra note 21, at 853.
59. FEDER, supra note 56, at 7-10 & n.4.
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to supplant the hospital industry's extant quality assurance activities,' stating
in committee reports that "[the inclusion of these conditions is designed to
support the efforts of the various professional accrediting organizations spon-
sored by their medical and hospital associations, health insurance plans, and
other interested parties to improve quality of care in hospitals."61
As a mechanism of further defining covered benefits, Congress established
statutory definitions of health care institutions that were eligible to participate
in the Medicare program.62 Congress also required the Secretary of HEW to
develop conditions of participation for health care institutions to define the
quality and other standards to be met by providers participating in the Medicare
program.6' The Secretary subsequently developed conditions of participation
for hospitals, nursing homes, home health agencies, and other health care
institutions.'
Congress initially adopted some interesting provisions regarding the
conditions of participation as well as the role of private accreditation in
determining compliance with these conditions. Specifically, the Medicare statute
originally provided that "requirements [in the conditions of participation] could
not be higher than the comparable requirements prescribed for the accreditation
of hospitals by the JCAH."65 The hospital industry strongly promoted this
provision to ensure the dominance of private regulation of hospitals through the
JCAHO.' Nevertheless, states could still technically preclude accredited
hospitals from participating in Medicare, as the Medicare statute required
hospitals to comply with state licensure laws where present.67
Also, in the Social Security Amendments of 1965, Congress established that
private accreditation by the JCAHO would constitute a conclusive determina-
tion of quality for purposes of the Medicare program. The statute authorized
similar treatment of private accreditation of hospitals, nursing homes, and home
health agencies by the American Osteopathic Association or "any other national
accreditation body" if the Secretary finds that the accrediting body provides
"reasonable assurance that any or all conditions" of the definitive requirements
for hospitals, extended care facilities, and home health agencies in section
1861' are met.69  Initially, HEW made the "deeming" mechanism available
60. Id. at 7.
61. S. REP. No. 404. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1969;
H.R. REP. No. 213, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 25-26 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1969.
62. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1861(e), (j), (o), 79 Stat. 286,314-15,
317-18, 320-21 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(e), (j), (o) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
63. Id.
64. See 42 C.F.R. 88 482.1-.66 (1993) (hospitals); id. §§ 483.1-.480 (nursing homes); id. §§ 484.1-.52
(home health agencies).
65. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1861(e)(8), 79 Stat. 286,314 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395(e)(8) (1988)).
66. See FEDER, supra note 56, at 7-10.
67. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1861(e)(7), 79 Stat. 286,314 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(7) (1988)); Jost, supra note 21, at 853 & n.163.
68. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1865, 79 Stat. 286, 326 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Jost, supra note 21, at 853 & n.163.
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only to hospitals. 7°  Only recently, the Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") extended the "deeming mechanism to all healthcare
institutions including nursing homes. 71
Pursuant to the "deeming" mechanism, the Medicare program could
recognize accreditation of a health care institution by a private accrediting body
as compliance with Medicare Conditions of Participation.' Initially, private
accreditation insulated accredited health institutions from routine inspections by
state survey agencies to determine compliance with federal requirements, and
accreditation reports were confidential even with respect to HEW and state
regulators. 73 Despite use of the "deeming" mechanism, health care institutions
have been subject to validation and complaint investigation surveys since shortly
after inauguration of the Medicare program.
In the Social Security Amendments of 1965, Congress also explicitly required
that psychiatric and tuberculosis hospitals be accredited in order to participate
in the Medicare program.74 In so doing, Congress used JCAHO accreditation
as a means of actually defining the psychiatric and tuberculosis hospital benefits.
In Cospito v. Heckler, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld
Medicare's use of private accreditation to set standards for health care insti-
tutions against a challenge that such standard-setting was an improper
delegation.75 In 1984, Congress amended the conditions of participation for
psychiatric and tuberculosis hospitals to remove this requirement.76
B. The Medicaid Program
Because Medicaid is a joint federal/state program with primary administra-
tive responsibilities lying with the states, Congress provided a different ar-
rangement for assuring the quality of health care institutions participating in the
Medicaid program. Specifically, Congress mandated as a state plan requirement
that states establish standards for institutions serving Medicaid recipients. 77
Most states already had licensure programs for hospitals and nursing homes in
place, as licensure of hospitals and nursing homes was a requirement for state
participation in the Hill-Burton program. 7' Further, in the late 1960s, HEW
69. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L.No. 89-97, § 1865, 79 Stat. 286, 326 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
70. Medicare Program: Granting and Withdrawal of Deeming Authority to National Accreditation
Organizations, 58 Fed. Reg. 61,816 (1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 401, 488, 489).
71. Id; see infra notes 86-90, 113, 115-16 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
73. See Jost, supra note 21, at 856-57.
74. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 1861(f), (g), 79 Stat. 286, 315-16
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 99 1395x(f), (g) (1988)).
75. See, e.g., Cospito V. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1131 (1985).
76. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 2335(b)(1), 2340(a)(1)(4), 98 Stat. 499,
1091, 1093 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
77. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1902(a)(22)(B), 79 Stat. 344, 348
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(22)(B) (1988)).
78. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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did promulgate regulations establishing minimal requirements for health care
institutions, including nursing homes, participating in the Medicaid program.79
The nursing home requirements were generally less strict than Medicare
standards. By regulation, HHS subsequently made Medicare Conditions of
Participation for hospitals, nursing homes, and home health agencies applicable
to institutions participating in the Medicaid program.'
Further, in the 1970s and 1980s, states increased their reliance on JCAHO
accreditation as indicia that institutions met state licensure requirements."1 As
of 1982, at least thirty-eight states had incorporated JCAHO accreditation into
their facility licensure program in some capacity.8 Thus, although operational-
ly different than the Medicare program, JCAHO accreditation has effectively
performed a compliance determination for hospitals and, to a lesser extent,
other health care institutions under most state Medicaid programs.
C. Home Health Agencies
Home health agencies had a different experience with private accreditation
under the Medicare program than hospitals. As there has always been pluralism
in private accreditation of home health agencies,' it is not surprising that two
major accrediting bodies, the National League of Nursing and the JCAHO,
sought recognition as accreditors for the Medicare program. In the mid-1980s,
the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") agreed to "deem"
accreditation by both the National League of Nursing and the JCAHO as
compliance with Medicare standards.' HCFA deferred recognition because
Congress mandated changes in the Medicare Conditions of Participation for
home health agencies as well as the survey and certification procedures for
home health agencies." In 1991, HCFA proposed revisions in the Medicare
Conditions of Participation for home health agencies.'
In 1991, HCFA again proposed recognition of the National League of
Nursing and JCAHO accreditation.' In May 1992, HCFA issued a notice
79. Notice of Interim Policies and Requirements, Amount, Duration, and Scope of Medical
Assistance, 33 Fed Reg. 16, 165 (Nov. 5, 1968); Notice of Interim Policies and Requirements, Standards
for Payment for Skilled Nursing Home Care, 34 Fed. Reg. 9788 (June 24, 1969); see Butler, supra note
31, at 1322, 1332.
80. 42 C.F.R. § 482.1 (hospitals); id. § 483.1 (long-term care facilities); see infra note 104 and
accompanying text.
81. Jost, supra note 21, at 858.
82. Id. at 844-45, 848.
83. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
84. Notice, Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Recognition of Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations' Home Care Program Standards and the National League for Nursing's
Standards for Home Health Agencies, 52 Fed. Reg. 49,510 (1987) (proposed Dec. 31, 1987).
85. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4021-4022, 101 Stat. 1330,
1330-67 to 1330-71 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(j) (1988)).
86. Medicare Program Conditions of Participation for Home Health Agencies, 56 Fed. Reg. 32,967
(1991) (proposed July 18, 1991).
87. Notice, Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Recognition of the Community Health Accreditation
Program Standards for Home Care Organizations, 56 Fed. Reg. 43,929 (1991) (proposed Sept. 5, 1991);
Notice, Medicare Program: Recognition of the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare
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granting "deemed" status to home health agencies accredited under the
Community Health Accreditation Program standards of the National League of
Nursing.' A year later, in June 1993, HCFA issued a final notice providing
that JCAHO accredited home health agencies would be "deemed" to comply
with the Medicare Conditions of Participation.' Both notices provided that
private accreditation would be pursuant to an unannounced survey and
contained other provisions to enhance government oversight.
Concerns about quality assurance of home health service agencies emerged
because home health agencies provide care in patient's homes over which there
is little or no oversight of services actually being delivered.' The final notices
recognizing JCAHO accreditation explicitly outlined extensive "look behind"
provisions authorizing HHS or state agencies to conduct additional inspections
or validate JCAHO accreditation findings.91
D. Nursing Homes
Private accreditation for nursing homes has always been controversial.
Congress had been concerned about the adequacy of state licensure for nursing
homes since the inception of the Medicare and Medicaid programs and had
admonished states to improve licensure programs.' In the late 1960s,
Congress began holding extensive hearings on the serious quality problems in
nursing homes throughout the United States93 and produced a multivolume
report outlining the serious quality problems in nursing homes and the inability
of states as well as HEW to assure quality effectively.'
Consequently, in the Social Security Amendments of 1972, Congress
specifically took steps to address these problems9' by creating a new category
of nursing facility, called "skilled nursing facilities," to provide skilled nursing
care under both the Medicare and Medicaid programs." All skilled nursing
Organizations Standards for Home Care Organizations, 57 Fed. Reg. 4044 (1992) (proposed Feb. 3,
1992).
88. Final Notice, Medicare Program: Recognition of the Community Health Accreditation Program
Standards for Home Care Organizations, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,773 (May 29, 1992).
89. Final Notice, Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Recognition of the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations Standards for Home Care Organizations, 58 Fed. Reg. 35,007
(June 30, 1993).
90. See, e.g., The Black Box of Home Care Quality: Hearings before the House Select Comm. on
Aging, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Johnson, supra note 38, at 929.
91. 58 Fed. Reg. at 35,008 (1993); 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,774-75 (1992).
92. S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2016; see
Butler, supra note 32, at 1322-23; see also Patricia Butler, Nursing Home Quality of Care Enforcement:
Part I-Litigation by Private Parties, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 622 (1980)[hereinafter Butler, Part 1];
Patricia Butler, Nursing Home Quality of Care Enforcement: Part l--State Agency Enforcement
Remedies, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 665 (1980).
93. Trends in Long-Term Care: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Long-Term Care of the Senate
Special Comm. on Aging, 91st-94th Cong. (1969-1975); see Butler, supra note 31, at 1322-23.
94. See Butler, supra note 31, at 1322-23 & n.32.
95. Butler, supra note 31, at 1326.
96. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 246, 86 Stat. 1329, 1424 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(j) (1988)); see Butler, supra note 31, at 1322-23; see also Butler, Part
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facilities, whether participating in Medicare or Medicaid, were subject to the
same conditions of participation and the same federally funded state survey and
certification program.' States continued to regulate "intermediate care
facilities" that provided custodial nursing home care to Medicaid beneficia-
ries.98
Nursing homes have for years pressed for the availability of the "deeming"
mechanism of private accreditation for purposes of Medicare participation. In
the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration proposed "deeming" JCAHO
accreditation of nursing homes as compliance with Medicare conditions of
participation requirements.9 This proposed rule precipitated a firestorm of
consumer protest as well as congressional legislation establishing a six-month
moratorium on use of private accreditation in the regulation of nursing
homes1" and a call for a study of nursing home quality and enforcement by
the Institute of Medicine.1 °1 The Reagan Administration abandoned this
initiative in the face of congressional pressure and a widely held belief that
quality of nursing home care was problematic, governmental regulation of
nursing homes was poor, and deregulation was thus unwarranted."
Indeed, there was widespread concern about the quality of care in nursing
homes. 3 Following the publication of the Institute of Medicine report,
Congress enacted detailed provisions on how states should regulate the quality
of care in nursing homes through more rigorous procedures for the survey and
certification of nursing homes by state agencies.1" Congress eliminated the
distinction between "skilled nursing facilities" -and "intermediate care facili-
ties"10 5 and consolidated regulation of all nursing homes providing services to
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries into one program. The reforms in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 were consistent with the trends in
I, supra note 92, at 622.
97. See supra notes 4-9.
98. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
99. Medicare and Medicaid Programs, Survey and Certification of Health Care Facilities, 47 Fed.
Reg. 23,407 (1982) (proposed May 27, 1982).
100. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 135, 96 Stat. 324, 375.
101. COMMITTEE ON NURSING HOME REG., INST. OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF
CARE IN NURSING HOMES (1986).
102. Id. at 2; SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE, 10077H CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICARE AND MEDICAID HEALTH BUDGET
RECONCILIATION AMENDMENTS OF 1987, at 76-77 (Comm. Print. 1987); REPORT TO THE RANKING
MINORITY MEMBER, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: STRONGER
ENFORCEMENT OF NURSING HOME REQUIREMENTS NEEDED, H.R. Doc. No. 113,87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
103. See, e.g., UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID:
STRONGER ENFORCEMENT OF NURSING HOME REQUIREMENTS (July 1987); Henry A. Waxman,
Consensus Calls for Nursing Home Reform, 12 PROVIDER, Nov. 1986, at 15.
104. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4211, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-
188 to 1330-193 (codified as amended in scattered subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)). Now, nursing homes participating in Medicaid must also meet Medicare Conditions of
Participation. 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.1-457 (1993); see supra note 80.
105. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No 100-203, § 4211, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-
103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1919(a) (1988)).
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nursing home regulation: increasingly rigorous and detailed government regula-
tion with stricter federal oversight. It is noteworthy that commentators have
suggested that the "deeming" mechanism, in lieu of direct government regula-
tion, is inappropriate for nursing homes.1"
E. Continuing Controversy
From the early days of Medicare and Medicaid, the role of JCAHO
accreditation in determining compliance with Medicare conditions of participa-
tion has been controversial. Right off the bat, consumer groups challenged this
JCAHO function for hospitals as an improper delegation of legislative
power.1" In 1972, Congress, responding to consumer pressure about the
adequacy of JCAHO standards to protect consumers as well as the concerns
about the propriety of the broad delegation,"8 made the first of many changes
in the "deeming" arrangement for JCAHO. Specifically, in the Social Security
Amendments of 1972, Congress authorized HEW to promulgate hospital condi-
tions of participation that were stricter than JCAHO standards." 9 More
importantly, Congress empowered HEW to validate JCAHO accreditation by
state inspections performed at random or in response to complaints, and
authorized the release of JCAHO accreditation survey reports to HEW for
validation."' In the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Congress expanded the
number of health care organizations for which "deeming" of private accredita-
tion as compliance with Medicare conditions of participation was available."'
Congress also mandated that the Secretary of HHS keep accreditation surveys
confidential."1 Despite these changes, particularly in the expansion of HHS
authority for direct oversight, the JCAHO "deeming" mechanism has remained
the predominant method by which the Medicare program determines hospital
compliance with Medicare Conditions of Participation. These reforms greatly
enhanced federal oversight of the "deeming" process and ended the rather
anomolous situation of the government regulator having no independent
authority to verify the performance of the private accreditor.
In 1987, Congress made major changes in the procedures by which HCFA
appoints accrediting bodies for which the "deeming" mechanism is available
106. Jost, supra note 21, at 882.
107. See Self-Help for the Elderly v. Richardson, No. 2016-71 (D.D.C. 1972); Jost, supra note 21, at
855.
108. Jost, supra note 21, at 855-57.
109. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 244(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1422-23
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395aa(c), 1395bb(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Jost, supra note
21, at 856 & n.186.
110. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 244(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1422-23
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395aa(c), 1395bb(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Jost, supra note
21, at 856 & n.186.
111. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2345, 98 Stat. 494, 1096 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (Supp. V 1993)).
112. Id.
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under section 1865 of the Social Security Act.113 Specifically, Congress
required HCFA to publish a notice of its intent to recognize a private
accrediting body in the Federal Register at least six months before it actually
"deems" compliance with the accrediting body's standards as compliance with
the Medicare Conditions of Participation.1 4  This requirement provides an
opportunity for consumers and other interested parties to challenge HCFA
decisions if they believe the standards or compliance determination procedures
to be inadequate. In 1993, HCFA published a final rule setting forth procedures
for recognizing the accreditation by private accrediting bodies as meeting the
Medicare Conditions of Participation. "5 These regulations implemented the
important changes in the use of accreditation by Medicare that Congress
adopted in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 and subsequent legislation." 6
Confidentiality of accreditation reports has continued to be problematic. In
the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Congress eliminated the confi-
dentiality requirement for home health agencies altogether." 7  In 1989,
Congress authorized the Secretary of HHS to disclose an accreditation survey
and associated information on all health care institutions to the extent the
survey and information are related to an HHS enforcement action.' 18
Congress also mandated the release of information directly related to a JCAHO
accreditation survey pertaining to whether an institution meets Medicare
Conditions of Participation.1 9
Clearly the trend in the Medicare program is toward use of private
accreditation to determine compliance with Medicare requirements for all
healthcare institutions but with better oversight by HCFA.' ° Hospitals and
home health agencies now have the option of using the "deeming" mechanism.
The option is theoretically available with nursing homes, although it does seem
that this option is inconsistent with the tight regulation of nursing homes under
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987."' Concomitant with the
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
114. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4039(0, 101 Stat. 1330,
1330-82 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
115. Medicare: Granting and Withdrawal of Deeming Authority to National Accreditation
Organizations, 58 Fed. Reg. 61,816 (1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 401, 488, 489); see also
Medicare: Granting and Withdrawal of Deeming Authority to National Accreditation Organizations,
55 Fed. Reg. 51,434 (1990) (proposed Dec. 14, 1990).
116. See supra note 112 and infra note 118.
117. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 411, 102 Stat. 683, 768
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a) (Supp. V 1993)).
118. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6019,103 Stat. 2106,2165-
2166 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a) (Supp. V 1993)).
119. Id.
120. See DOUGLAS C. MICHAEL, FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF AUDITED SELF-REGULATION AS A
REGULATORY TECHNIQUE (1993) (Preliminary Draft for the Administrative Conference of the United
States) (to be published in 47 ADMIN. L. REV., No. 2 (1995)).
121. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. Even HCFA has recognized the unlikelihood that
private accreditors would be interested in developing programs for deeming nursing homes as meeting
Medicare Conditions of Participation given the strict requirements of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987. See Granting and Withdrawal of Deeming Authority to National
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expansion of the "deeming" option has been greater access to the information
developed by private accreditors in the compliance determination process as
well as increased regulatory controls such as access to and release of accredita-
tion reports where private accreditation appears to have fallen short.
IV
A THEORY FOR THE APPROPRIATE USE OF PRIVATE ACCREDITATION
In developing a theory for use of private accreditation in public health in
public health insurance programs, an excellent point of departure is a recent
recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States about
the appropriate use of audited private regulation." Specifically, the Confer-
ence recommended that private regulatiom be used when both the responsible
governmental agency and the private organization have the organizational
ability in terms of expertise, experience and authority to implement the
regulatory assignment effectively."i Also, according to the Administrative
Conference, the private organization should have fair procedures for the
development of regulatory standards and the responsible governmental agency
should have access to applicable records of the private organization. 24
Initially, the use of private accreditation by the Medicare program for
hospitals did not meet these criteria mainly because the JCAHO accreditation
reports were confidential even from federal regulators."z But as indicated
above, Conhress has modified this situation substantially and has required
private accreditors to provide HCFA with accreditation reports and even to
publicize the reports to the extent they relate to governmental enforcement
actions.126 Over time, Congress and HHS have become more thoughtful about
the use of private accreditation so that the deeming arrangement comports, for
the most part, with the criteria for appropriate use of private regulation the
Administrative Conference recommends.
However, just meeting the Administrative Conference recommendations is
not sufficient in public health insurance programs. A theory of appropriate use
of private accreditation in public health insurance programs also requires
consideration of the nature and types of institutions to be accredited.
Accreditation Organizations, 58 Fed. Reg. 61,816, 61,823 (1993).
122. Administrative Conference of the United States, The Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a
Regulatory Technique, Recommendation 94-1 (adopted June 16, 1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 44,701 (Aug. 30,
1994); see MICHAEL, supra note 120.
123. Administrative Conference of the United States, The Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a
Regulatory Technique, Recommendation 94-1 (adopted June 16, 1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 44,701 (Aug. 30,
1994); see MICHAEL, supra note 120.
124. Administrative Conference of the United States, The Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a
Regulatory Technique, Recommendation 94-1 (adopted June 16, 1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 44,701 (Aug. 30,
1994); see MICHAEL, supra note 120.
125. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
From the inception of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, the federal
government and the states have treated hospitals, nursing homes, and home
health agencies differently with respect to the role of private accreditation in
defining and enforcing quality standards. Specifically, HHS permitted an
expanded role of private accreditation for hospitals but has been reluctant to
extend this role to other types of health care institutions, particularly those
engaged in long-term care. Only recently has HHS permitted private
accreditation of home health agencies to demonstrate compliance with the
Medicare Conditions of Participation.127 Regarding nursing homes, the trend
has been toward increasingly strict government regulation and until recently
outright rejection of the use of private accreditation."2
This history suggests that important reasons may exist for the disparate
treatment of these health care institutions in terms of private accreditation
under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Clearly, in terms of delegating to
private accreditors the compliance determination function regarding quality
standards, there has been consensus that hospitals, nursing homes, and home
health agencies should be treated fundamentally differently. Yet, what
differences between hospitals, nursing homes, and home health agencies warrant
this belief? Now that Congress and HCFA have expanded Medicare's use of
private accrediting bodies to all types of health care institutions, the disparate
quality assurance experience with hospitals, home health agencies, and nursing
homes may provide helpful insights for the future use of accreditation of the
Medicare program and new health insurance programs established under any
health reform initiative.
To answer the question of when private accreditation is appropriate, one
must examine the characteristics of health care institutions and the patients they
serve.129 With regard to the institutional characteristics, the important factors
are the following: (1) the type of institutional control in terms of corporate
status and professional involvement; (2) the accessibility to the public; and (3)
the type of services offered. 1"° Regarding patient populations, important
factors include the degree of dependency, vulnerability, and mental competence.
Also important are the mechanisms for assuring accountability of private
accreditors and public regulators in their compliance determination function
and, specifically, whether significant differences exist between these mechanisms.
127. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
129. In developing this theory, I am indebted to Professor Sandra H. Johnson of the St. Louis
University School of Law, whose work analyzed different regulatory approaches to quality assurance
for hospitals and nursing homes and the implications for quality assurance for home health agencies.
See Johnson, supra note 38, at 923-33.
130. Id. at 924.
[Vol. 57: No. 4
Page 47: Autumn 1994] SUBSTITUTION FOR REGULATION
A. Characteristics of Providers, Their Services, and the Patients They Serve
The following specific characteristics of providers are important in
determining the appropriateness of private accreditation for public health
insurance programs: the nature of institutional control; public accessibility to
the venue where care is directly provided to the patient; and the type of services
provided. Perhaps of most overriding concern are characteristics of the
institution's typical patients and, specifically, the degree to which they are
dependent, vulnerable, and of diminished mental capacity.
There are two aspects to the factor of institutional control. One is the
traditional notion of corporate control, that is, for-profit or not-for-profit. The
prevailing assumption regarding the health care industry is that not-for-profit
organizations have a greater commitment to quality and a greater capability to
assure quality than for-profit corporations."' While this assumption may be
overstated or even unfounded,'32 the dominance of the for-profit corporate
form in the nursing home industry has been noted as a leading reason for
quality problems in that sector.133 Hospitals, which have enjoyed private
regulation under Medicare since the program's inception, are distinguished by
community prestige and a dominant not-for-profit tradition." Home health
agencies are divided among not-for-profit visiting nurse associations with their
heritage in the public health mission of the nineteenth century and a vigorous
for-profit sector of more recent origin.'35
The second and probably more important consideration is the nature of the
professional control and, specifically, whether there is a single profession
dominating the management of the institution. If there is a dominant
professional group that has its own traditions of professional excellence and
mechanisms for professional discipline, then the impetus for quality assurance
within the institutions maintained by the profession already exists at a high
level. For example, the medical profession has dominant authority over the
quality assurance mechanisms in hospitals, and the nursing profession has
dominant authority over the quality of care in home health agencies.136 It is
fair to assume that the professional ethics that mandate quality of care in the
practice of these two professions are incorporated into the management policies
131. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock & Allen E. Buchanan, The Profit Motive in Medicine, 12 J. MED. &
PHIL. 1 (1987); Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 963
(1980); Robert Veatch, Ethical Dilemmas of For-Profit Enterprise in Health Care, in THE NEW HEALTH
CARE FOR PROFIT: DocTORS AND HOSPITALS IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 125 (Bradford H.
Gray ed., 1983).
132. Baruch A. Brody, Justice and Competitive Markets, 12 J. MED. & PHIL. 37 (1987); Arnold S.
Relman & Uwe Reinhardt, An Exchange on For-Profit Health Care, in FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN
HEALTH CARE 209 (Bradford H. Gray ed., 1986).
.133. Nicholas Rango, Nursing-Home Care in the United States: Prevailing Conditions and Policy
Implications, 307 NEW ENO. J. MED. 883, 887 (1982).
134. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
136. See Johnson, supra note 38, at 925-27.
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of the institutions that they dominate. It is significant that the nursing home
industry, which is largely for-profit, developed chiefly under the auspices of
laymen and has never been dominated by a single professional group.13 7 It
has also exhibited serious quality and even safety problems
38
Accessibility to the venue of care is also crucial in determining the
appropriateness of private accreditation for public health insurance programs.
The more accessible and public the venue of care, the more likely it is that
caregivers will feel accountable for the care they provide and for the behavior
they exhibit during the provision of care. Conversely, the more isolated the
venue, the greater the potential for poor care and even possible abuse by
individuals providing services. Simply, direct supervision and oversight are not
present in more isolated venues. Hospitals are relatively public venues for the
provision of health care, with many people around to witness the provision of
care. Nursing homes are more isolated, and families, when they visit, are the
only regular observers of care provided. Home health agencies provide care in
the most private of venues, the patient's home.
Another crucial factor is the character of services provided. Health care
institutions are often defined by the type of services they provide, for example,
long-term or psychiatric care, although this situation may change in the new
health care environment. The most important distinction for the three types of
health care institutions in this analysis is between long-term care and medical
care. Long-term care services differ from acute medical services provided in a
hospital or even skilled nursing services provided by Medicare-certified home
health agencies. Most long-term care services are specifically designed to assist
individuals in conducting the activities of daily living,'39 unlike medical care
which seeks to ameliorate or eliminate the physical condition that necessitates
assistance in conducting those activities."
As a result of this difference in the purpose of long-term care compared to
medical care, the nature of the services involved are fundamentally differ-
ent. 4" Most of the individuals who provide direct services are "unskilled" in
the sense that they do not have or need special education or extensive training
to provide the service competently. The professional component of long-term
care services, in contrast to medical care, resides primarily with the managers
of the individuals providing direct care, for example, case managers with
training in social work or nursing. Nurses do provide many long-term care
services and specifically skilled nursing services, but they have a less direct role
137. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
139. ROSALIE A. KANE & ROBERT L. KANE, LONG-TERM CARE: PRINCIPLES, PROGRAMS AND
POLICIES 4-6 (1987).
140. Rosalie A. Kane & Robert L. Kane, Long-Term Care: Variations on a Quality Assurance
Theme, 25 INQUIRY 132, 133 (1988).
141. Specifically, long-term care services are defined as "health, personal care, and social services
given over a sustained period to persons who have lost some capacity for self-care because of a chronic
illness or condition." Id.
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with those in need of help with activities of daily living. The Kanes have made
an important observation about quality assurance for long-term care services:
Whereas critics might accuse acute care providers of insufficient appreciation of their
limitations and a tendency to pursue the inefficacious, LTC ["long-term care"] as a
field suffers from the opposite predilection. It is plagued by an overriding sense that
the clientele are in inevitable decline, which contributes to generally low self-esteem
and discouragement among LTC practitioners. If LTC recipients inevitably worsen,
why bother charting their deterioration? Quality assurance efforts in LTC, therefore,
must combat therapeutic nihilism while achieving a synthesis between the principles
of quality assurance and the nature of LTC. Because of its poor self-image and lack
of independent, self-directed professional standard setting, improvements in LTC will
require a stronger external impetus than is the case for acute care. 4"
The characteristics of typical patients of health care institutions are crucial
in determining the appropriateness of private accreditation. The important
patient characteristics are the degree of dependence, vulnerability, and mental
capacity. Specifically, is the patient capable of leaving the facility if treated
badly? Does the patient have the mental competence to recognize poor care
or abuse? Is the patient so dependent as to be afraid to challenge an abusive
or poor quality caregiver? Nursing home patients are very dependent and
vulnerable; few have any expectation of returning to the community. Home
health agency and hospital patients vary widely but are probably less dependent
and vulnerable than nursing home patients. The more vulnerable, dependent,
and mentally compromised the patients are, the greater the danger that these
patients might be endangered if regulatory oversight of the safety and quality
of their care is limited.
B. The Compliance Determination Function: Ensuring Accountability
A major concern regarding delegation of the compliance determination
function is whether the private model imposes sufficient accountability on
private accrediting bodies to ensure that they discharge their compliance
determination function in ways that protect patients and treat providers fairly.
With direct government regulation, accountability is presumably imposed
through the political process. Specifically, regulators in a democratic system are
subject to pressure from elected officials if their performance is deficient.
Further, public regulators are generally subject to extensive legislative,
executive, and judicial oversight, unlike private accreditors.'43
The question then is whether comparable accountability can be achieved
when private accrediting bodies conduct the compliance determination
function.1" However, one must not assume that government necessarily acts
with more accountability than private accreditors. Rather, one must analyze the
detailed characteristics of genuine accountability to determine if these features
142. Id. at 132; see also Johnson, supra note 38, at 924.
143. Kane & Kane, supra note 140, at 132.
144. See Abramson, supra note 4, at 182.
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can be present or incorporated into a compliance determination function that
relies chiefly on private accrediting bodies.
The best means for assuring accountability in the compliance determination
function, for both patients and providers, would be to establish procedures that
allow patients and providers to challenge decisions that they believe are
inaccurate. However, neither the Medicare and Medicaid statutes nor state
licensure laws contain provisions allowing either patients or providers to
challenge the decisions of private accreditors. The Medicare statute does
provide for government oversight of the decisions of private accreditors
regarding accreditation of health care institutions. As discussed above, Congress
has increased oversight over JCAHO accreditation of hospitals since the
inception of the Medicare program.145 Also, with the "deeming" of private
accreditation of home health agencies, HHS expressly required "look behind"
authority for state agencies to check on accreditation decisions." Some state
statutes and judicial decisions have recognized a private right of action to
enforce state licensure laws particularly with respect to nursing homes.147
Finally, the JCAHO and other accrediting bodies do have procedures for
providers to challenge accreditation decisions as well as extensive opportunities
throughout the survey process to correct deficiencies and thereby remove the
threat of losing accreditation.
The ability of private parties to challenge government decisions affecting
them is a central concern of due process jurisprudence. The procedural due
process doctrine ultimately seeks to impose accountability on public decision-
makers chiefly by requiring fair processes for making and renewing decisions
rather than by assessing the substance of the decisions. Indeed, according to
Mathews v. Eldridge," the essential inquiry in due process analysis is the
nature of the interests of the private party and government and the degree to
which additional procedures will positively influence the accuracy of the
decision.
The threshold question in determining the rights of any challenger is
whether the challenged activity involves public or private action."4 This issue
145. See supra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
147. CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY: READINGS, NOTES, AND
QUESTIONS 524-32 (1988); SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL., NURSING HOMES AND THE LAW: STATE
REGULATION AND PRIVATE LITIGATION §§ 1-21 to 1-28, (1985); John P. Ludington, Annotation,
Licensing and Regulation of Nursing or Rest Homes, 53 A.L.R.4TH 689 (1987 & Supp. 1993); see also
Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1984) (class action suit brought by nursing home
residents receiving Medicaid holding that the Secretary of HHS had violated the Medicaid Act by
failing to provide a system to inform herself adequately as to whether facilities receiving federal money
were satisfying the Act's requirement for high quality patient care).
148. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
149. See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 4; Henry J. Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra-Fourteen
Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982); Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote
on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296 (1982); Frank I. Goodman, Professor Brest on
State Action and Liberal Theory, and a Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1331 (1982);
Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423 (1982).
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is important when government transfers functions to private organizations. In
the case of private accreditation, does the Due Process Clause protect patients
served by the accredited health care institution to challenge accreditation
decisions which adversely affect their health and safety? Given that the
decisions of private accreditors in these disputes pertain directly to certification
for participation in government-sponsored health insurance programs, the
determination of whether state action exists should be straightforward, unlike
the determination in other contexts." In Schweiker v. McClure,51 the
Supreme Court assumed that private actors executing Medicare program
responsibilities, that is, private insurance companies conducting beneficiary
appeals, must comport with due process requirements.
Having determined that the requisite public action is involved, the second
inquiry is to determine whether there is a protected property or liberty
interest. 52 The rights of patients to challenge decisions of accrediting
organizations exercising their compliance determination function is problematic.
While patients clearly have a recognized entitlement interest in government
health insurance programs, 53 they have no protected rights upon which to
base a challenge to accreditation decisions of private accreditors or even
decertification decisions of government regulators.'-
In Cospito v. Heckler,155 involuntarily committed patients in a psychiatric
hospital for which the JCAHO terminated accreditation argued unsuccessfully
that termination bf their Medicare hospital benefits without allowing their
participation in the JCAHO accreditation proceeding denied them procedural
due process. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled
that there was no deprivation of a protected interest under procedural due
process because the patients' loss of benefits in the Medicare program was only
"indirectly" caused by the government's decision to decertify the hospital.
1 56
In O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center,157 the Supreme Court denied that
patients in a nursing home had a similar due process interest in the state's
decertification of the facility under the Medicaid program.
158
150. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
151. 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
152. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
153. See, e.g., O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773 (1980); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319;
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254.
154. See, e.g., O'Bannon, 447 U.S. at 773; Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1131 (1985).
155. 742 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1131 (1985).
156. Id. at 82.
157. 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
158. At least one commentator has suggested that vulnerable nursing home patients should have a
protected interest in nursing home decertification decisions because of the traumatic impact of the
decision, given that they would have to move to maintain their health insurance benefits. See Jane
Beyer, The Need to Change Traditional Entitlement-Doctrine Analysis in Decertification of Nursing
Homes, 59 N.C. L. REV. 943 (1981):
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The protected interests of providers from a constitutional perspective are
even more limited despite the fact that decisions of private accreditors and their
role in determining participation in government health insurance programs
greatly affect the economic interests of health care providers. The Supreme
Court and lower federal courts have refused to recognize that providers have
a protected interest under the Due Process Clause to participate in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs.'59 Nevertheless, courts have recognized an
obligation of the government not grounded in the Constitution to proceed
according to due process principles. Specifically, some authority provides that
challengers have remedies against the government when it has not followed
proper procedures in the decisionmaking process as contemplated by Con-
gress." This hazy doctrine basically concludes that government must conduct
its functions in an orderly, predictable, and fair manner in relation to all parties,
not just those with a constitutionally protected property or entitlement
interest.16 ' However, this authority provides little comfort to providers so long
as accreditation determinations and state certification decisions are made
through fairly regular procedures.
In sum, neither patients nor providers have any real recourse against
government agencies or private accrediting bodies to challenge compliance
determination decisions on substantive grounds under the Due Process Clause
or other legal authority. However, the fact that the current legal position of
patients and providers is essentially the same vis-,d-vis government regulators
and private accreditors is important. Decisions about the propriety of private
accreditors' assuming the compliance determination function need not be made
on the basis that extant legal rights or procedural protections are compromised
by the selection of one approach over the other. Rather, decisions can be based
on other substantive factors, such as whether beneficiaries of the government-
sponsored health insurance program have adequate input in the standards
established or the enforcement procedures of any private accrediting body.
Currently, the political process is the avenue through which patients and
providers impose accountability on either government regulators or private
accreditors in the compliance determination function. Are private accreditors
as sensitive to legitimate public pressure as government regulators in the
compliance determination process? Empirical evidence is not available to
answer this question definitively. A recently published study by Public Citizen's
Health Research Group suggested some evidence that the JCAHO and its
159. See, e.g., O'Bannon, 447 U.S. at 773; St. Francis Hosp. Ctr. v. Heckler, 714 F.2d. 872 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984); Geriatrics, Inc. v. Harris, 640 F.2d. 262 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 832 (1981).
160. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
161. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 670 (1959); Scanwell Lab., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Gonzales, 334 F.2d at 570; Garrott v. United States, 340 F.2d 615 (Ct. Cl. 1965). See generally
KENNETH CuLP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.13 (3d ed. 1972).
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compliance determination procedures exhibited shortcomings with respect to
accountability.162
There are incentives in the current private accreditation process that do
suggest that the political pressures on private accreditors would be different.
Specifically, health care institutions pay for the accreditation process and private
accreditors depend on those fees for their financial well-being. Also, private
accreditors are dominated by the institutions and professions that they regulate
in ways that government regulators are not. These factors suggest that direct
government regulation may be more susceptible to legitimate political pressure,
particularly from consumers, and it may be more sensitive in assuring the
protection of vulnerable and dependent patients in the public quality assurance
process.
C. The Standard Setting Function: Ensuring Pluralism, Progress, and
Consumer Choice
The theory presented above for assessing when and how private accredita-
tion should substitute for direct government regulation in public health
insurance programs pertains chiefly to the delegation of the compliance
determination function. However, there are important issues regarding the
delegation of the standard setting function as well.
Under the predominant model for use of private accreditors in government
health insurance programs, such as the Medicare program, the standards of
private accreditors can serve only as the basis of the Medicare program's quality
definition and assurance function if they track the Medicare Conditions of
Participation.163 For example, as discussed above, HCFA deferred recognition
of two private accreditors for home health agencies after Congress changed the
conditions of participation for home health agencies, because the standards of
the private accreditors needed revision to comport with the revised federal
standards."6 Thus, even though the Medicare statute ostensibly encourages
the use of private accreditation to define quality, the pressure on private
accreditors to be recognized by the Medicare program results in a convergence
of the standards of private accreditors with the Medicare Conditions of
Participation.
This phenomenon is unfortunate. According accrediting bodies the
imprimatur of government approval when their standards conform to govern-
ment standards for government health insurance programs has a potentially
undesirable impact on the development of new quality standards and measures.
It is significant that the JCAHO, the predominant accreditor for health care
institutions, has really not been the leader in developing quality standards for
162. JOAN STEIBER & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC CITIZEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, WHO'S
WATCHING OUR HOSPITALS? 30 (1994).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
164. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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any health care institution. Indeed, the two major quality assurance movements
of the last twenty years, the emphasis on outcomes as the definitive feature of
quality'65 and the total quality management movement,1" developed first
within health institutions and the health services research community. Only
later, and then only in response to pressure from these constituencies, did
JCAHO standards incorporate these innovative developments into quality
assurance in the health care field.167 Now the JCAHO sees outcomes and
other similar clinical indicators as crucial components of quality assurance that
serve to meet the public accountability needs of health care institutions:
The Joint Commission, as the traditional standard-setter for quality of care,
clearly has a potential role in-helping physicians and health care organizations
meet their public accountability needs. But the historical approach of
establishing structure and function standards, which only determine a
capability for providing high-quality patient care, will no longer suffice. There
is now a need to determine whether that capability was effectively acted out.
Indeed, did the patient benefit or perhaps suffer from the provision of services
or the lack thereof?6
Private accreditors, independent of a regulatory role in government public
health insurance programs, would have greater flexibility to conceptualize
quality of care in innovative ways and possibly develop better quality standards
for the health care institutions they accredit. In so doing, they would have great
potential to promote pluralism, diversity, and competition among health care
institutions and thus greater consumer choice in a changing health care
environment. 69 Clearly, information about quality provided by accreditation
is an important public good that can have a crucial impact on the ability of
health care institutions to compete more effectively by distinguishing themselves
from other providers.170
165. Robert H. Brook & Katherine N. Lohr, Monitoring Quality of Care in the Medicare Program,
258 JAMA 3138 (1987); Robert H. Brook & Katherine N. Lohr, Efficacy, Effectiveness, Variations, and
Quality: Boundary-crossing Research, 23 MEDICAL CARE 710 (1985); Paul M. Ellwood, Shattuck Lec-
ture-Outcomes Management: A Technology of Patient Experience, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1549 (1988);
David Eddy & John Billings, The Quality of Medical Evidence: Implications for Quality of Care,
HEALTH AFFAIRS, Spring 1988, at 19; Arnold M. Epstein, The Outcomes Movement-Will It Get Us
Where We Want to Go?, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 266 (1990).
166. See Donald M. Berwick, Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Health Care, 320 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 53 (1989); Glenn Laffel & David Blumenthal, The Case of Using Industrial Quality Management
Science in Health Care Organizations, 262 JAMA 2869 (1989); see also AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE
POLICY AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SUMMARY REPORT.
PUrING RESEARCH TO WORK IN QUALITY IMPROVEMENT AND QUALITY ASSURANCE (1993).
167. See Dennis S. O'Leary, The Joint Commission Looks to the Future, 258 JAMA 951 (1987);
Dennis S. O'Leary, Agenda for Change Fosters CQI Concepts, 2 JOINT COMMISSION PERSP. 3 (1992);
Steven Schroeder, Outcome Assessment 70 Years Later: Are We Ready? 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 160
(1987).
168. O'Leary, supra note 167.
169. See Clark C. Havighurst, Commentary: Accreditation Competition Needed, MODERN HEALTH
CARE, Nov. 16, 1992, at 24.
170. See Clark C. Havighurst & Nancy M. P. King, Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel:
An Antitrust Prospective (pt. 1), 9 AM. J. L. & MED. 131; Id. (pt. 2), 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 263 (1983);
Philip C. Kissam, Government Policy Toward Medical Accreditation and Certification: The Antitrust
Laws and Other Procompetitive Strategies, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1983).
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While it is unlikely that HCFA and state Medicaid agencies are willing to
deal with multiple accreditors whose standards vary widely, it is tantalizing to
speculate as to what might evolve in the changing health care environment if
public health insurance programs were to establish minimal standards for health
care institutions and release all private accreditors from any regulatory
responsibilities in public health insurance programs. What kind of innovative
and imaginative quality improvement methods could they conceive and promote
in the absence of a regulatory role? On the other hand, their regulatory
responsibilities may promote an associated rigor and practicality in their
standards of compliance reviews that might not otherwise be present.
Another problem with government delegation of the standard setting
function for public health insurance programs for private accrediting bodies is
accountability, particularly to consumers. Generally, when the federal
government sets important standards for public health insurance programs, it
uses rulemaking procedures such as the notice-and-comment procedures under
the Administrative Procedure Act,17 which provides notice to consumers of
the proposed standards and an opportunity to comment. With private
accreditors, the process for influencing the content of standards is less accessible.
Private accreditors do not have comparable formal processes by which to
contact consumers in a systematic fashion and to assure that all consumers have
an opportunity to influence the content of the standards.
Furthermore, few legal remedies exist to enforce the accountability of
private accreditors in their exercise of the standard setting function, particularly
for consumers. Specifically, due process protections are really only available to
parties challenging the compliance determination function of an accrediting
body, an adjudicative activity, and not the standard setting function, a legislative
activity. Generally, individuals have greater rights to protection under due
process when government or its delegates are adjudicating rights and responsi-
bilities under existing laws and policy than when government and its delegates
are engaged in the legislative function of policymaking. The Supreme Court has
been quite emphatic in its declaration that legislative decisions do not warrant




This article offers a theory and some observations on how and when private
accreditation should assume regulatory functions in public health insurance
programs. The theory developed suggests that the characteristics of institutions
and patients are crucial in determining appropriateness of delegating the
171. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); see Abramson, supra note 4, at 200.
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compliance determination function to new types of health care institutions.
Currently, neither private accreditation nor public regulation offer particularly
effective mechanisms for consumers to utilize in imposing further accountability
on the part of decisionmakers in determining an institution's compliance with
the health insurance program's quality standards, or even in setting the
standards. But one must question whether the imposition of a regulatory role
on private accrediting bodies inhibits the most promising contributions of
private accreditation in the changing health care environment-redefining
quality of health care services in innovative ways yet to be contemplated.
